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Previous neuroimaging studies have implicated the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) and nearby brain regions in deception. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that lying involves the executive
control system. To date, the nature of the contribution of different
aspects of executive control to deception, however, remains
unclear. In the present study, we utilized an activation likelihood
estimate (ALE) method of meta-analysis to quantitatively identify
brain regions that are consistently more active for deceptive
responses relative to truthful responses across past studies. We
then contrasted the results with additional ALE maps generated for
3 different aspects of executive control: working memory, inhibitory
control, and task switching. Deception-related regions in dorsolat-
eral PFC and posterior parietal cortex were selectively associated
with working memory. Additional deception regions in ventrolateral
PFC, anterior insula, and anterior cingulate cortex were associated
with multiple aspects of executive control. In contrast, deception-
related regions in bilateral inferior parietal lobule were not
associated with any of the 3 executive control constructs. Our
findings support the notion that executive control processes,
particularly working memory, and their associated neural sub-
strates play an integral role in deception. This work provides
a foundation for future research on the neurocognitive basis of
deception.
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Deception can be broadly defined as the attempt to mislead.
Although researchers have long been interested in deception
and the ability to detect deception (Langfeld 1920; Adler and
Larson 1928), until recently such efforts have been limited to
the study of indirect physiological and behavioral data such as
electrodermal conductance (Guertin and Wilhelm 1954), pupil
dilation (Berrien and Huntington 1943), heart rate (Cutrow
et al. 1972), and errors in responding (Kintz 1975). Others have
gained insight from the study of deception in brain-injured
patients and psychologically disturbed individuals (Wiley
1998).
Technological advances have provided new tools for
studying deception. For example, scalp-recorded event-related
potentials (ERPs) have provided insights into deception
(Rosenfeld 2001; Johnson et al. 2004), but the low spatial
resolution inherent in ERP methodology has hindered the
ability to localize the underlying brain regions involved (Fender
1987; Gonzalez Andino et al. 2001). A growing number of
researchers have used functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) to study
deception (Spence et al. 2001, 2004; Langleben et al. 2002,
2005; Lee et al. 2002, 2005; Ganis et al. 2003; Kozel, Padgett,
and George 2004; Kozel, Revell, et al. 2004; Davatzikos et al.
2005; Kozel et al. 2005; Nuñez et al. 2005; Phan et al. 2005; Abe
et al. 2006; Mohamed et al. 2006).
As with prior research, recent neuroimaging studies may be
conceptualized as arising from 1 of 2 primary motivations: 1) to
detect deception or 2) to differentiate of the neurocognitive
processes underlying deception (‘‘differentiation of deception,’’
Furedy et al. 1988). Although these aims are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, it is often the case that studies designed for
one purpose are not optimal for the other (for additional
discussion, see Furedy et al. 1988).
For example, in one of the first neuroimaging studies on
deception, Langleben et al. (2002) employed a variation of the
Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) (Lykken 1959, 1960; Furedy and
Ben-Shakhar 1991), a questioning technique that has been used
extensively in the forensic field. Importantly, the traditional
GKT relies not only on the detection of deception per se but
also on the detection of recognition memory for details of the
crime scene (Ben-Shakhar and Elaad 2003). In the study of
Langleben et al., participants were given a playing card (e.g., a 5
of clubs) and instructed to deny their possession of the card
when later queried. Once in the scanner, participants were
shown a series of playing cards and were then asked whether
or not they possessed each card. With the exception of the
aforementioned target card (e.g., 5 of clubs), participants
responded truthfully to all cards. Whereas this paradigm may be
effective in evaluating the usefulness of neuroimaging techni-
ques in detecting deception, it provides minimal insight into
deception as a psychological process insomuch as deceptive
responding is confounded with recognition memory for the
relevant playing card.
In contrast, several neuroimaging studies have taken
a differentiation of deception approach (e.g., Furedy et al.
1988) in hopes of identifying those cognitive processes and
associated neural substrates inherent to deception. These
studies typically have studied deceptive responding as it relates
to 1) personal possession of an item (within the context of
a modified version of the aforementioned GKT paradigm), 2)
past autobiographical information and/or specific personal
experiences, 3) recently completed action events, or 4)
knowledge recently acquired through passive experience. In
each case, the researchers compared brain activation during
a truth condition, in which participants responded correctly to
presented stimuli, to brain activation during a deception
condition, in which participants intentionally responded in-
correctly to stimuli.
Building upon the previously described study by Langleben
et al. (2002), subsequent researchers have further adapted the
GKT paradigm so as to account for the contribution of
recognition memory and therefore provide greater insight into
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the neurocognitive basis of deception. In these later studies
(Davatzikos et al. 2005; Langleben et al. 2005; Phan et al. 2005),
researchers modified the methodology by giving participants 2
playing cards (instead of one) and instructing them to deny
their possession of one of the cards (i.e., lie) but admit
possession of the other card.
Another paradigm involves asking participants about past
autobiographical information and/or salient events from their
past and prompting them to respond incorrectly (i.e., lie) on
a subset of the test items. Nuñez et al. (2005) gave participants
a yes/no memory test for autobiographical knowledge (e.g.,
‘‘Can you ride a bicycle?’’) as well as nonautobiographical
knowledge (e.g., ‘‘Is New York City in Ohio?’’). Ganis et al.
(2003) gathered information about specific past personal
experiences from participants. Later, participants were promp-
ted to generate lies based on rehearsed and unrehearsed false
information relating to these past experiences, thus allowing
the researchers to make a further distinction between
memorized and spontaneous lies. Spence et al. (2008) had
participants recount past personal events that someone would
typically want to conceal (because the incident was awkward,
embarrassing, etc.). Participants were then asked questions
about these events and were directed to lie on a subset of the
questions (participants were free to choose which items to lie
vs. tell the truth on). Studies by Lee et al. (2002, 2005)
focused on another particular instance of deception: feigned
memory impairments. In these studies, participants were
administered a simple visual matching task or a short-answer
autobiographical memory test (e.g., ‘‘Where were you born?’’).
In separate conditions, participants were prompted to re-
spond correctly, incorrectly, randomly, or so as to feign
memory impairment.
Other studies have focused on deception as it relates to
recently completed action events. Both Spence et al. (2001)
and Abe et al. (2006) had participants selectively lie during
performance of a yes/no memory test for action events that
they may have engaged in earlier in the day. Whereas Spence
et al. focused on action events that participants may have
completed as part of their typical daily routine (e.g., making the
bed), Abe et al. had participants actively engage in a subset of
action events that were administered by the experimenters
shortly before the scanning session. In a similar vein, Mohamed
et al. (2006) had a subset of participants perform a single salient
action event (i.e., the firing of a starter pistol) and later deny
having done so.
Kozel et al. (2005) instructed participants to ‘‘steal’’ a watch
or ring (their choice) and place it among their personal
belongings in a locker. Later in the scanner, participants were
asked questions about taking the items (which they were to
deny) as well as general knowledge questions (e.g., ‘‘Is it
October?’’) and questions about minor wrongful behaviors that
they may have engaged in (e.g., ‘‘Do you speed?’’). Participants
were told to respond truthfully to these latter 2 types of
questions.
Lastly, studies by Kozel, Padgett, and George (2004) and
Kozel, Revell, et al. (2004) focused not on memory for action
events per se but on knowledge gained through past personal
action. Specifically, participants were prompted to lie about the
location of money (i.e., a $50 bill) which they had learned
through recent personal experience (i.e., participants were
instructed to search under various items in a room to locate the
money).
Despite the general commonalities noted above, the specific
methodology utilized to generate a deceptive response varied
across studies and involved differences in context, motivation,
spontaneity, and response modality. Given this variability and
the apparent difficulty of replication across studies, it is
perhaps not surprising that few consistent findings have
emerged.
One potential exception relates to the prefrontal cortex
(PFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Indeed, a majority
of the aforementioned studies have found deception-related
activity in aspects of one or both of these brain areas. From
a cognitive standpoint, this is consistent with the conceptual-
ization of deception as an executive control intensive task (e.g.,
Spence et al. 2001; Langleben et al. 2002; Johnson et al. 2004;
Iacono 2007; Langleben 2008; Spence 2008).
Generally speaking, executive control refers to a set of
higher order cognitive processes that allow for the flexible
modification of thought and behavior in response to changing
cognitive or environmental contexts (Stuss 1992). Converging
evidence from patient, animal, and neuroimaging studies (e.g.,
Goldman-Rakic 1990; Cummings 1993; D’Esposito et al. 1998)
suggest that the PFC and surrounding brain regions play
a particularly important role in executive control.
Recent work by Miyake and colleagues (Miyake et al. 2000)
using a latent variable approach to analyze data from a large
sample of young adults on several complex cognitive tasks
suggests that executive control may be best conceptualized as
comprising at least 3 different component processes: 1)
working memory, 2) task switching, and 3) inhibitory control.
Within this context, it has been hypothesized that all 3 as-
pects of executive control may contribute to deception to the
extent that deception involves: keeping the truth in mind
while formulating a deceptive response (working memory),
suppressing a truthful response (inhibitory control), and
switching between truthful and deceptive responses (task
switching) (e.g., Johnson et al. 2004; Langleben 2008; Spence
et al. 2008).
The PFC and ACC are relatively large cortical areas, each
comprising multiple regions that may be functionally and
anatomically distinct. For example, the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC)
represent 2 subregions of the PFC and have been implicated in
maintenance and manipulation of information, respectively
(D’Esposito et al. 1998). The ACC is suggested to include dorsal
and rostral--ventral subregions that play a role in cognitive and
affective processing, respectively (Bush et al. 2000). It is thus of
interest to ascertain whether the aforementioned consistent
finding of deception-related activity in the PFC and ACC can be
further localized to particular subregions of these brain areas.
Previous attempts to address this question have been limited
to narrative (e.g., Iacono 2007) and/or table-based literature
reviews (e.g., Spence 2008). Such approaches are inherently
qualitative in nature and must be interpreted with caution
given that they typically rely on author-supplied anatomical
labels that may be unduly broad (e.g., ‘‘PFC’’) or, in some cases,
inaccurate. (For example, in their meta-analysis on the Stroop
task, Laird, McMillan, et al. [2005] found that, for more than
25% of the reported foci, the author-provided anatomical labels
did not agree with the corresponding atlas-derived labels.)
Comparison of reported focus coordinates across studies can
also prove challenging in that localization of a given set of
coordinates to a particular neuroanatomical location is
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dependent on the target brain atlas and corresponding
stereotaxic space in which the data set was registered.
In the present study, recent advancements in meta-analytic
computation and foci transformation are brought to bear on
this topic. We utilize an activation likelihood estimate (ALE)
method of meta-analysis to more precisely identify brain
regions that consistently show deception-related activity across
past studies. In addition, we employ a new method for
translating disparate foci into a common stereotaxic space,
thereby improving the accuracy of the quantitative meta-
analysis.
This study has 2 major aims. The first is to identify ‘‘core’’
brain regions consistently involved in deception, regardless of
the precise nature of the deceptive act. Based on previous
research, we hypothesize that these core brain regions will
encompass aspects of the PFC and associated brain regions.
The second is to evaluate whether different regions impli-
cated in deception are engaged in different aspects of ex-
ecutive control. To this end, we contrast the derived
deception ALE map with additional ALE meta-analysis maps
generated based on the previous imaging studies focusing on
working memory, inhibitory control, and task switching.
Consistent with the hypothesis that all 3 aspects of executive
control play a role in deception, we predict that the deception




Consistent with the notion that deception is a more demanding
cognitive task than simply telling the truth, few studies report regions
showing greater activation for truthful responding as compared with
deceptive responding (but see Langleben et al. 2005). Accordingly, we
focused our present efforts on the much more common findings of
increased neural activation for deceptive relative to truthful responses.
Further, in line with previous ALE meta-analyses (e.g., Turkeltaub et al.
2002; Buchsbaum et al. 2005; Owen et al. 2005), the measure of interest
was the location of such activation rather than effect size (see
Discussion).
To identify appropriate articles for the deception meta-analysis,
several online electronic databases (e.g., PsychInfo, MedLine, PubMed)
were searched in April 2008 using various combinations of relevant
search terms (e.g., deception, lying, fMRI, PET, MRI, neuroimaging). The
following inclusion/exclusion criteria were used to select articles for
the present meta-analysis:
1. Only articles that utilized PET or fMRI methodology were
considered. Electrophysiological- (e.g., electroencephalography,
magnetoencephalography, skin conductance response [SCR]) and
behavioral-only studies were excluded. Both blocked and event-
related studies were allowed, in order to obtain sufficient data to
conduct the meta-analysis. Activations recorded using a block design
may represent both transient item-related activity as well as sustained
activity related to task set (Visscher et al. 2003). Activations observed
in event-related studies reflect only the transient component. As
such, brain regions identified via the meta-analysis as showing
consistent activation across these 2 different types of studies likely
reflect the common component: item-related activity. Similar
limitations prevented us from considering additional dimensions
(e.g., commonalities/differences in behavioral paradigms, sample
characteristics, etc.) in separate meta-analyses.
2. Only articles with experiments that yielded a clear contrast
representing locations of greater activation for deceptive responding
as compared with telling the truth and that did not include an
obvious limitation (e.g., confound with recognition memory;
Langleben et al. 2002) were included.
3. Only articles that reported areas of peak activation for the lie versus
truth contrast in a standardized coordinate space (e.g., Talairach and
Tournoux 1988) were considered. Other articles (e.g., only reported
Brodmann areas [BAs] or only showed contrast maps) were
excluded.
4. Only peer-reviewed articles reporting previously unpublished data
involving a sample size of at least 7 participants were included.
Twelve studies met these criteria and were included in the present
meta-analysis. A total of 173 activation foci representing regions of
significantly greater activation for deceptive responses (i.e., lies) as
compared with truthful responses were compiled from these studies.
These peak activations were then used to generate an ALE map
(Turkeltaub et al. 2002) to identify brain regions that are frequently
implicated in deception across a variety of experimental situations.
Table 1 summarizes the included studies.
Executive Control Meta-analyses
We also generated ALE meta-analysis maps representing brain regions
consistently found to be involved in different aspects of executive
control, namely working memory, inhibitory control, and task switch-
ing. For the working memory map, we adopted studies (24) and
associated foci (668) identified in a previously published meta-analysis
of the n-back task, a widely used working memory measure (Owen
et al. 2005). The studies (19) and foci (205) utilized for the inhibitory
control map were based on a previous ALE meta-analysis of the Stroop
color-word task published by Laird, McMillan, et al. (2005). Similarly,
the studies (18) and foci (231) for the task switching map were the
same as those used by Buchsbaum et al. (2005) in their meta-analysis on
this latter construct.
The inclusion/exclusion criteria were generally similar across the
aforementioned studies and the present deception ALE meta-analysis
(e.g., use of PET or fMRI methodology, 3-dimensional [3D] coordinates
reported in stereotaxic space, inclusion of canonical contrast of
2 conditions, data from neurologically uncompromised participants).
Detailed descriptions of the inclusion criteria are available in the
original publications (Buchsbaum et al. 2005; Laird, McMillan, et al.
2005; Owen et al. 2005) and are not reproduced here. Any modest
variations in criteria across studies reflect the relative maturity and
current state of research in the respective area; therefore, these
differences were maintained for the present comparisons. For
example, in the case of the working memory and inhibitory control
ALE maps, there was sufficient data available to focus in on a specific
experimental paradigm (n-back task and Stroop task, respectively),
whereas for task switching and the present deception ALE maps, this
was not possible.
Table 1
Data sources included in the deception meta-analysis





Langleben et al. (2005) 19 fMRI SPM2 Manual
Phan et al. (2005) 11 fMRI SPM99 Manual
Past personal information/experience
Ganis et al. (2003) 12 fMRI AFNI Manual and verbal
Lee et al. (2002)—Experiment 2 22 fMRI AFNIa Manual
Nuñez et al. (2005) 8 fMRI SPM2 Manual
Spence et al. (2004) 5 fMRI SPM99 Verbal
Spence et al. (2008) 7 fMRI SPM2 Verbal
Recent action events
Abe et al. (2006) 4 PET SPM2 Verbal
Kozel et al. (2005) 32 fMRI SPM2 Manual
Spence et al. (2001) 6 fMRI SPM99 Manual
Recent knowledge
Kozel, Padgett, and George (2004) 11 fMRI SPM2 Manual
Kozel, Revell, et al. (2004) 10 fMRI SPM96 Manual
Lee et al. (2002)—Experiment 1 26 fMRI AFNIa Manual
aThe authors appear to have utilized a nonstandard registration algorithm; however, the target
space (T88) was identical to that employed in AFNI.
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Projecting Foci by Study-Specific Stereotaxic Projection to the PALS-
B12 Atlas Surface
All the compiled foci had been translated previously into one or
another standardized stereotaxic atlas space (e.g., Talairach and
Tournoux 1988); however, the precise coordinates of the foci were
derived using a variety of atlas targets and volume registration methods
(e.g., Statistical Parametric Mapping [SPM], AFNI). These differences in
anatomical templates and registration algorithms can result in sub-
stantial differences in the stereotaxic coordinates of a given geographic
location (Van Essen 2005; see below). To compensate for these
differences, we utilized Caret 5.5 software (http://brainvis.wustl.edu/
caret/) (Van Essen et al. 2001) along with the population-average
landmark- and surface-based atlas (PALS) (Van Essen 2005) to translate
stereotaxic coordinates from different studies into a common atlas
space (Van Essen and Dierker 2007).
Using structural MRI volumes obtained from a group of 12
neurologically uncompromised young adults, Van Essen (2005)
generated the PALS-B12 atlas in the Washington University 711-2C
space (Buckner et al. 2004; Head et al. 2005) by a process that involved
surface-based registration to a population-average target using a stan-
dard set of geographic landmarks. Each of the 12 contributing
individual hemispheres was resampled to a ‘‘standard mesh’’ format
(Saad et al. 2004), represented by 73 730 surface points (nodes) per
hemisphere. The 12 contributing left hemispheres were spatially
averaged (node-by-node) to generate an average fiducial left hemi-
sphere surface in 711-2C space; the same was done for the 12
individual right hemispheres. Each node on the left or right 711-2C
average fiducial surface (e.g., node #14538) represents a particular
location in that space and is associated with a cloud of points at
geographically corresponding locations in the 12 contributing hemi-
spheres (Van Essen 2005).
To generate average fiducial surfaces for other stereotaxic spaces,
each of the PALS-B12 individual brain volumes (starting in 711-2C
space) was registered to 5 other stereotaxic spaces (SPM99, SPM2,
AFNI, FLIRT, and MRITOTAL) using the methods provided in these
other software packages. (The default volume registration algorithms
associated with each analysis method were utilized in generating each
average fiducial surface. If a given neuroimaging study used a non-
standard processing stream, this might lead to slight deviations in the
relationship of the reported foci to geographic landmarks in the PALS
atlas surface. However, any such deviations are likely to be much
smaller than the misalignments that would occur if comparisons were
made by projecting foci from different studies to a single atlas surface
that did not respect the stereotaxic space in which the foci were
reported [Van Essen and Dierker 2007].) The resulting deformation
(e.g., affine matrix for FLIRT and MRITOTAL, piecewise linear
transformation prescribed in the +tlrc.HEAD for AFNI, and *sn.mat for
SPM) for each individual volume was then applied to each hemisphere’s
711-2C surface coordinates, resulting in surfaces for each target space.
PALS-B12 average fiducial surfaces were then generated for the left and
right hemispheres in each of these stereotaxic spaces using the same
spatial averaging process described above. In addition, SPM96 atlas
space was equated to MRITOTAL and SPM95 space to AFNI, based on
how these earlier registration methods were carried out.
Each node (e.g., node #14538) in the PALS-B12 standard mesh
surface represents a particular geographic location (e.g., the medial tip
of the central sulcus) on the left or right hemisphere cortical surface
but can have substantially different spatial coordinates, depending on
the stereotaxic space in which the average fiducial surface is visualized.
The differences are largest when comparing spaces in which the target
has the dimensions of the original Talaiarach and Tournoux (1988)
brain (e.g., AFNI space) to spaces in which the target is the MNI152
population-average brain (e.g., FLIRT, SPM99) or the MNI305 popula-
tion-average brain (e.g., MRITOTAL). The differences also depend upon
brain region and can exceed 1 cm in regions near the dorsal, ventral,
anterior, or posterior extrema of the hemisphere.
Recently added functionality in Caret (version 5.5 and higher) allows
the user to project stereotaxic foci from the stereotaxic space in which
they were originally reported into any other of the 7 previously
mentioned stereotaxic spaces (tutorial document and data at http://
sumsdb.wustl.edu/sums/directory.do?id=658520&dir_name=CARET_
TUTORIAL_SEPT-06). This is done by preserving the spatial relationship
between each focus and the nearest tile of the average fiducial surface for
the appropriate stereotaxic space. Using this method, all the foci in the
present meta-analysis were translated into a common stereotaxic space
(FLIRT space). The choice of FLIRT (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/flirt/
) was motivated by the desirability of using a target atlas (the MNI152
population average) whose dimensions are representative of a normal
population and a registration algorithm that is robust and widely used
(Van Essen and Dierker 2007). The stereotaxic coordinates for any of the
other spaces can be determined by downloading the data and viewing
the foci of interest in relation to the average fiducial surface of the
stereotaxic space of interest.
ALE Map Generation
We utilized the methodology and software provided by Turkeltaub
et al. (2002) to generate a whole-brain statistical map representing the
likelihood of activation on a voxel-by-voxel basis. In brief, a 3D Gaussian
distribution, with a standard deviation of 6 mm (Full width at half
maximum = 15 mm), was used to model the localization probability
distribution for each activation focus. The resulting values were then
multiplied by a factor of 8 mm3 to reflect the fact that our target spatial
resolution was 2 3 2 3 2 mm, and our interest was in the probability of
a focus lying ‘‘anywhere’’ within a given voxel rather than at the center
of the voxel. This process was repeated such that 172 probability values
(one for each of the activation foci obtained from the deception
literature) were generated for each voxel. (For the working memory,
inhibitory control, and task switching ALE analyses, 668, 205, and 231
probability values were generated, respectively.) These values were, in
turn, used to calculate the likelihood that at least one of the activation
foci fell within a given voxel. The result was a whole-brain ALE map.
The above described procedure was repeated for 5000 permutations
of randomly distributed foci, and the resulting values were used to
calculate the expected probability value for a given voxel under the
null hypothesis (i.e., a random distribution of foci) at various levels of
statistical significance (for more detailed description, see Turkeltaub
et al. 2002). The output of this analysis then was used to threshold our
whole-brain ALE map so as to achieve a P value of 0.05 while
controlling for false discovery rate (Genovese et al. 2002; Laird, Fox,
et al. 2005). Localization of significant regions of interest (ROIs) to
particular geographic regions was based on a probabilistic map of sulcal
identity generated using the 12 contributing brains of the PALS-B12
atlas (Van Essen 2005). Localization to particular cortical areas was
based on maps of cortical areas registered to the PALS atlas from the
partitioning schemes of Brodmann (1909) and Öngür et al. (2003).
The present data set, as well as other data sets utilizing the PALS-B12
atlas, are available for further visualization and analysis via the SumsDB
database (http://sumsdb.wustl.edu/sums/directory.do?id=6600996).




Figure 1 shows the spatial locations of 173 deception-related
activation foci displayed in relation to the PALS-B12--inflated
left and right hemisphere atlas surfaces. The boundaries of
selected Brodmann’s (1909) cytoarchitectonic areas (black
borders) and the areas of Öngür et al. (2003, light blue borders)
as charted on the PALS-B12 atlas surface (Van Essen 2005) are
also shown. Foci are scattered across many BAs but with
relatively high incidence in areas 24/32, 39/40, 44/45, and 9/
10/46 on the right and areas 6, 40, and 44 on the left. The
number of foci in the right hemisphere (93) is slightly greater
than in the left hemisphere (75), with 5 foci falling on or near
the hemispheric midline.
An automated peak search algorithm identified the location
(in atlas coordinates) of peak activations within the ALE map
on the basis of level of statistical significance with the proviso
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that they be separated by 12 mm, or else, the peaks were
consolidated by coordinate averaging. Regions around the peak
activations were identified by choosing contiguous voxels
within 10 mm of the peak activation that surpassed the
statistical threshold within the z plane of peak activity and in
both of the contiguous planes. This method revealed 13 ROIs in
the whole-brain volume (Table 2), including 7 ROIs in the right
hemisphere, 5 in the left, and 1 (region 12) along the midline.
Two ROIs (regions 5 and 8) are centered in subcortical regions
in and near the internal capsule and did not intersect the PALS
average fiducial surface; these are not considered further. The
total volume of right hemisphere ROIs (16.3 cm3) greatly
exceeded that of left hemisphere ROIs (4.7 cm3). The greater
right hemisphere bias by the ALE analysis presumably reflects
tighter clustering of foci on the right.
Figure 1 also shows the ROIs derived from the ALE analysis
after mapping to the PALS atlas surfaces. Comparison with the
overlay of the 173 individual foci shows that the significant
ROIs generally reflect clusters of foci involving more than one
paradigm type; none are associated with just a single study or
even paradigm type. About half of the foci are situated far from
a significant ROI and thus do not contribute to the remaining
analyses.
Regions that were bilaterally symmetric include pars
opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, regions 2 and
6), anterior insula (regions 1 and 9), and angular sulcus in the
inferior parietal lobule (regions 4 and 7). The unilateral ROIs
include left middle frontal gyrus (region 10), the right ACC
(region 12), the right intermediate frontal sulcus (region 3),
and the right intraparietal sulcus (region 13). The precise
location and size of each ROI is detailed in Table 2.
Contributions of Different Paradigms
As noted earlier, sufficient data were not available to conduct
a separate meta-analysis for each paradigm type. However,
visual inspection of Figure 1 confirms that foci from multiple
paradigms appear to contribute to each of the ROIs. For
instance, foci from all 4 paradigm types (modified GKT, past
personal info/experience, recent action events, and recent
knowledge) are associated with the right IFG ROI (region 2).
This finding further supports the hypothesis that the identified
ROIs are core regions associated with deception across a variety
of contexts.
Comparison between Deception and Executive Control
Meta-analyses
Figure 2 shows the results of the working memory, inhibitory
control, and task switching ALE meta-analyses (green, red, and
blue, respectively) in relation to the PALS-B12--inflated left and
right hemisphere atlas surfaces. There was significant overlap
among all 3 executive control maps in portions of the bilateral
VLPFC (BA 44/45 and insular regions G and Ial), left DLPFC (BA
6/44/46), left ACC (BA 32), and left posterior parietal cortex
(BA 7). Additional overlap between the working memory and
inhibitory control ALE maps was observed in the right ACC (BA
24/32).
Overall, the working memory ALE map (green) was more
extensive than the maps associated with either of the 2 other
constructs. Large regions in the right DLPFC (BA 6/10/44/46)
and right posterior parietal cortex (BA 7) were associated
working memory, but not inhibitory control or task switching.
Rostral aspects of the bilateral ACC (right > left) were
Figure 1. Previously reported foci demonstrating greater activation for deceptive responses (i.e., lies) as compared with truthful responses overlaid on the results from the ALE
meta-analysis. ALE data were thresholded at a value of 0.00502 (which corresponds to p \ 0.05 False Discovery Rate corrected). Foci were projected by study-specific
stereotaxic projection to the PALS-B12 atlas surface (see Materials and Methods) and are viewed on the inflated PALS atlas surface (Van Essen 2005), color coded based on
paradigm type/content. The upper and lower panels show foci in relation to lateral and medial views of the average fiducial surface, respectively. Selected classical Brodmann
areas (black borders) as well as orbitofrontal areas (light blue borders) from Öngür et al. (2003) are also illustrated. On all surfaces, foci are shown ‘‘pasted’’ to the surface,
irrespective of whether their 3D coordinates lie above or below the surface.
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uniquely associated inhibitory control relative to working
memory and task switching. In terms of the task switching
ALE map, a region in the left occipital cortex (BA 19) was
associated with task switching but not working memory or
inhibitory control.
Figure 2 also allows for comparison of the executive control
ALE maps and the deception ALE map (regions outlined in
black borders). Overlap between the executive control ALE
maps and the deception ALE map occurred in the bilateral
anterior insula (regions 1 and 9), left IFG (region 6), left middle
frontal gyrus (region 10), right intermediate frontal sulcus
(region 3), right ACC (region 12), and right intraparietal sulcus
(region 13). There was little or no overlap between the
executive control and deception ALE maps in bilateral inferior
parietal lobule (regions 4 and 7) and right IFG (region 2).
Discussion
The present study supports the hypothesis that prefrontal brain
regions play a significant role in deception. Eight of the 13 brain
regions identified as consistently showing deception-related
activity across studies were located in or near the PFC. This
included bilateral aspects of the VLPFC, DLPFC, and anterior
insula as well as right ACC.
As noted earlier, a possible explanation for the extensive
involvement of the PFC in deception relates to the purported
Figure 2. Results of the working memory (green), inhibitory control (red), task switching (blue), and deception (black borders) ALE analyses viewed on the inflated PALS atlas
surface (Van Essen 2005).
Table 2
ROIs identified from ALE analysis (deception[ truth) in FLIRT stereotaxic space
Region Location BA Peak activation Volume (cm3) ALE value 3 103*
x y z
1 Right insula NA 37 20 6 3.7 10.09
2 Right IFG 6/44/45 52 14 6 3.7 10.13
3 Right middle frontal gyrus 9/10/46 32 43 26 3.4 9.29
4 Right inferior parietal lobule/supramarginal gyrus 39/40 59 50 29 2.0 8.33
5 Right internal capsule/thalamus NA 13 5 12 1.5 8.13
6 Left IFG 44 49 15 4 1.4 7.23
7 Left inferior parietal lobule 40 57 49 31 1.2 7.12
8 Left internal capsule NA 16 1 13 0.8 6.41
9 Left insula NA 35 13 2 0.9 6.36
10 Left precentral gyrus/middle frontal gyrus 6 42 1 53 0.4 6.11
11 Right insula NA 35 30 5 0.9 6.65
12 Right anterior cingulate 24/32 5 20 34 0.8 5.54
13 Right inferior parietal lobule 7/39 47 65 42 0.3 5.64
Note: NA, not applicable.
*P\ 0.05 (FDR corrected) in all instances.
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role of executive control processes, particularly working
memory (e.g., keeping truth in mind while formulating
a deceptive response), inhibitory control (e.g., suppressing
a truthful response), and task switching (e.g., switching
between truthful and deceptive responses) in deception. To
evaluate this possibility, we compared the results from the
deception ALE analysis with those from ALE maps generated
separately for each of the aforementioned aspects of executive
control.
Significant overlap was observed between regions involved
in deception and those underlying executive control—suggest-
ing that the aforementioned cognitive processes may indeed
contribute to the psychological phenomenon of deception.
Specifically, we found that a majority (10 of 13) of the
deception-related brain regions were also associated with
working memory, inhibitory control, and/or task switching.
‘‘General Use’’ Executive Control Regions
Deception-related ROIs were identified in bilateral IFG (BA 44),
bilateral insular regions, and right ACC (BA 24). The ROIs in the
left and right pars opercularis (regions 2 and 6) are centered in
the ventral part of area 44 but also extends into part of areas 6
and 45 and gustatory cortex (area G) in the right hemisphere.
The ROIs in the anterior insula involves agranular areas Iai and
Ial, plus part of area 47s (Öngür et al. 2003). Another ROI is
located in the right dorsal ACC (BA 24).
Results from previous studies (e.g., Buchsbaum et al. 2005;
Dosenbach et al. 2006) suggest that the frontal regions (i.e.,
bilateral IFG and insula; ACC) encompassed by the aforemen-
tioned ROIs may contribute generally to executive control
rather than being associated with one particular aspect of
executive control. These regions have been found to be
involved in both maintenance of task set as well as moment-
by-moment implication of cognitive control (Dosenbach et al.
2006). Consistent with this notion, we found that all the ROIs
(with the exception noted below) overlapped with more than
one of the ALE maps for working memory, inhibitory control,
and task switching. As such, it is difficult to speculate on the
specific role that these regions may play in deception above
and beyond their general involvement in executive control.
The executive control ALE maps, particularly those associ-
ated with working memory and inhibitory control, were more
extensive in the left VLPFC than the right. This left hemisphere
bias is likely related to the verbal nature of the Stroop task upon
which the inhibitory control meta-analysis was based as well as
the disproportional contribution of studies utilizing verbal
stimuli as compared with those utilizing nonverbal stimuli to
the working memory meta-analysis. (Indeed, a previous meta-
analysis of the go/no-go paradigm, a nonverbal inhibitory task,
found a right-sided bias [Buchsbaum et al. 2005].) Interestingly,
although deception is typically conceptualized as a verbal task
and the majority of deception studies that contributed to the
present meta-analysis involved verbal content, a similar later-
alization was not observed in the deception ALE map.
Specifically, the deception ALE map encompassed not only
a portion of the left IFG (region 6) but also a large region in the
right IFG (region 2), suggesting that both verbal and nonverbal
aspects of executive control are involved in deception.
In addition to their general involvement in executive
control, the insula and parainsular regions are implicated in
the control of visceral functions (Augustine 1996) and
representation of the body’s interoceptive activity (Craig
2003). It is also widely accepted that visceral responses (e.g.,
blood pressure, heart rate, body temperature) often accompany
deception (e.g, Chappell 1929; Cutrow et al. 1972). Hence, it is
not surprising that regions involved in visceral function and
interoceptive activity also show deception-related responses.
Working Memory--Related Regions
The deception ALE meta-analysis revealed 3 ROIs that overlap
with regions implicated in working memory but not in-
hibitory control or task switching in the ALE maps. These
include a region in and near the middle frontal gyrus in the
anterior right PFC (region 3), a region in dorsal aspects of the
right inferior parietal lobule (region 13), and a small ROI near
the junction of the left middle frontal and precentral gyri
(region 10).
In contrast, there was no evidence of any cortical area
showing isolated overlap between the deception ALE map and
either the inhibitory control or task switching maps. This
suggests that, whereas these 2 aspects of executive control
may play a role in deception, their involvement does not
necessitate the recruitment of function-specific regions. Taken
together, the current findings support the notion that working
memory plays a particularly important role in deception.
Nonexecutive Control Regions
Additional deception-related peak ALE activations were evident
in the left and right inferior parietal lobules (regions 4 and 7).
These regions did not overlap with any of the 3 executive
control ALE maps, suggesting that their involvement in
deception may be related to neurocognitive processes other
than working memory, inhibitory control, or task switching.
Whereas superior parietal areas and more dorsal aspects of the
inferior parietal lobule (including region 13) were associated
with executive control, the aforementioned 2 parietal ROIs
were located ventral to these areas.
These inferior parietal ROIs comprise brain regions that, in
concert with more frontal regions, have been implicated
previously in selective attention (e.g., Lynch 1980; Petersen
et al. 1989) and the detection of salient low-frequency (odd
ball) target events (e.g., Linden et al. 1999; Stevens et al. 2000;
Kiehl et al. 2001). Within this context, results from Langleben
et al. (2005) suggest that activity in the right IPL may be
modulated not only by the intent of the participant (truthful
responding vs. lying) but also by the relative frequency/saliency
of the associated response. The aforementioned study included
3 conditions: a lie condition and 2 truth conditions. In one
truth condition, correct responding was associated with the
same response (no) as lie trials. In the other truth condition,
correct responding was associated with a different, much less
frequent response (yes). The results showed greater activation
in the right IPL for the lie condition as compared with the same
response truth condition. Interestingly, the reverse was true
when comparing the lie condition to the latter more salient
truth condition. The right IPL showed greater activation for the
high saliency truth condition than the lie condition.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the IPL may play
a role in maintaining attention to environmental context in
order to detect (and respond) appropriately when instances
requiring deception arise. Further, its contribution appears to
be most evident in situations where the lie condition is equally
(if not more) salient as compared with the truth condition. This
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may help to explain why some deception studies (presumably
those with relatively more salient truth conditions) have failed
to find lie-related activity in this region (e.g., Ganis et al. 2003;
Kozel, Padgett, and George 2004; Kozel, Revell, et al. 2004;
Nuñez et al. 2005). Additional research is necessary to more
fully understand the role of the IPL in deception.
Interestingly, the link between these parietal association
areas and the act of lying is further bolstered by findings that
the skin conductance response, an often studied physiological
indicator of possible deception, appears to be mediated by
these regions (Tranel and Damasio 1994; Critchley et al. 2000).
In summary, the present meta-analyses provide additional
insight into the role of different aspects of executive control
and their associated neural substrates in deception. Working
memory appears to play an important role in deception
insomuch as deception-related regions in left DLPFC, right
anterior PFC, and right posterior parietal cortex were uniquely
associated with working memory (as compared with the other
studied aspects of executive control). Regions in VLPFC, insular
areas, and ACC may contribute to multiple aspects of executive
control (e.g., working memory and inhibitory control) that are
involved in deception. In contrast, deception-related regions in
bilateral inferior parietal lobule were not associated with any of
the 3 executive control constructs. We speculate that the
contribution of these regions to deception may be related to
attentional control. Lastly, little overlap was observed between
the deception and task switching ALE maps thus bringing into
question the contribution of this aspect of executive control to
deception.
Additional Avenues for Future Research
To the extent that the paradigms utilized in previous neuro-
imaging studies of deception do not emulate real-life instances
of deception, it remains possible that there are additional
neurocognitive processes that are involved in deception but
that are not revealed by the present meta-analysis. Whereas
ethical constraints will likely continue to prevent researchers
from fully emulating certain aspects of real-life deceptive
situations (e.g., the fear/anxiety associated with being caught,
the emotional valence of the subject matter of the lie), recent
advancements in fMRI methodology and analysis have allowed
researchers to begin to increase the ecological validity of such
studies on other fronts. For example, in a recent neuroimaging
study by Spence et al. (2008), participants were able to respond
vocally (presumably the typical modality for lying) and also
were allowed choose when to lie versus tell the truth. Future
research hopefully will continue to reduce the gap between
laboratory studies and real-world instances of deception.
A major motivation for studying deception is the ultimate
goal of being able to reliably detect when a given individual is
being truthful versus lying. In pursuit of this goal, there are 2
main questions should be addressed: Are there specific core
brain regions involved in deception that should be the focus of
study? And can the patterns of brain activation observed in
these regions be used to differentiate truth from lying on an
instance-by-instance and/or individual-by-individual basis?
The current meta-analysis represents a significant contribu-
tion to this line of research by identifying brain regions which
appear to be consistently involved in deception across various
deceptive situations studied to date. Future efforts may be best
directed toward identifying specific ‘‘patterns’’ of activation
across these regions that are indicative of deception as
compared with other complex cognitive tasks.
Along these lines, several studies have begun to address the
second question: Can fMRI signals be used to ‘‘detect’’
deception? By comparing the number of voxels within
a particular set of brain regions that were active during
deceptive responses (relative to a neutral condition) and the
number that were active during truthful responses (minus
a neutral condition), Kozel et al. (2005) reported some success
detecting deception at the individual participant level. In terms
of discriminating lie from truth at the single individual and
single-trial level, Davatzikos et al. (2005) suggest that the
utilization of machine learning methods to classify spatial
patterns of brain activation holds promise for event-by-event
identification of deceptive acts (i.e., lying). Interestingly, 2 of
the areas identified in the present meta-analysis, right BA 44
and left BA 40, were found to be informative by Davatzikos et al.
in terms of classification of lie versus truth on an item-by-item
basis. Langleben et al. (2005) took a slightly different approach.
Employing logistic regression analysis, Langeben et al. built
a predictive model based on the extent of activation in a subset
of brain regions. The regions showing the highest predictive
ability for classifying lie and truth trials were also identified in
the present meta-analysis, namely left BA 40 and left BA 6.
These studies represent an initial step in the ongoing pursuit of
lie detection ability using fMRI technology.
Limitations
The present paper focused on those brain regions demonstrat-
ing greater activation for deceptive as compared with truthful
responding. Regions demonstrating the opposite pattern of
activation (i.e., greater activation for truthful as compared with
deceptive responding) have also been reported (e.g., Langleben
et al. 2005). However, there are too few published coordinates
for application of ALE methodology to this issue. Future
research designed to elucidate the nature of those brain
regions showing greater activation for truth than deception
will be important. Indeed, shedding further light on these
‘‘deactivations’’ is likely to be instrumental in understanding
deception.
In general, the ALE approach to meta-analysis has several
apparent advantages over traditional meta-analytic methods.
Most importantly, it allows for quantification of both the
locations of common activation and the degree of concordance
across studies. In addition, the subjective aspects of the meta-
analysis process are relatively limited in that most aspects of
the ALE computations are automatized.
Importantly, the ALE method does not involve reanalysis of
the original raw data and instead must rely on secondary
analysis of results previously generated by disparate research
groups utilizing different statistical approaches and thresholds.
As such, the ALE approach (like other meta-analytic ap-
proaches) has limitations. For example, given that each entered
focus is given equal weighting in the ALE computations,
unequal contribution of foci across studies may, in turn, lead to
a bias of the ALE results towards one study (or set of studies)
over another. One potential source of such overrepresentation
relates to the statistical approach adopted across different
studies. Specifically, adoption of a less conservative statistical
threshold may result in a relatively greater number of activation
foci being reported for a given study as compared with another
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study utilizing a more conservative threshold. Similarly, ALE
results can be biased by overrepresentation of one paradigm
over another across the included studies. A focus for future
research is the further refinement of the ALE approach thus
allowing for the weighting of foci based on secondary factors
such as differences in statistical thresholding and behavioral
paradigms across studies. Despite such limitations and in light
of the alternates, the ALE approach to meta-analysis represents
a useful option for integrating findings across different studies
in situations where joint reanalysis of the original raw data is
not possible.
Conclusions
In conclusion, deception is a very complex phenomenon and
may be best conceptualized as a confluence of multiple
cognitive processes. Although researchers have long studied
deception, it is only recently that technological advancements
have allowed for the direct assessment of the neural substrates
underlying deception. In the present study, we used newly
developed meta-analysis methods to quantitatively identify
those brain regions that are consistently active across a variety
of situations involving deception. Results support the hypoth-
esis that executive control processes, particularly working
memory, and their associated neural substrates play an integral
role in deception. This work provides a foundation for future
research on the neurocognitive basis of deception.
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Nuñez JM, Casey BJ, Egner T, Hare T, Hirsch J. 2005. Intentional false
responding shares neural substrates with response conflict and
cognitive control. Neuroimage. 25:267--277.
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